## Approved For Release 2001/08/18: CHERDE 80-01065A000100170033-4 1

21 March 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

FROM:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT:

Paper entitled "National Psychological Strategy".

REFERENCE:

Memorandum from Admiral Stevens to DD/P dated

March 19, 1952.

1. The reference memorandum, the original of which is attached hereto, is invited to your attention. You will observe that Admiral Stevens
has gone over our paper rather carefully and has concluded that although
it is an admirable effort, there remain to be taken the two steps which
he has indicated in his memorandum. Will you please examine this matter
and let me know whether you believe it would be feasible to provide the
additional statements and information requested by Admiral Stevens and,
if so, in about how much time.

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2. In order to make absolutely certain that we get off on the right track in our further effort to comply with Admiral Stauens' request, it might be desirable for to discuss admiral Stauens' memorandum with himselfor with Although I believe I understand the points which the driving at, they are not crystal clear and even under my own interpretation of his meaning it seems to me that the job is much easier to describe than to do. He has asked us for some very definitive pinpointing of our present capacity and although we could furnish this up to a point, it must necessarily be speculative as to what the various "pluses" might be. The latter observation also holds with respect to the matter raised in Admiral Stevens' Paragraph 4. It would take quite a lot of speculation for us to say at this moment just how much extra advantage can be obtained from our existing mechanisms (some controlled and some only influenced) — taking into consideration the fact that we have not yet begun to realize the designed benefit from many of these.

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FRANK G. WISNER

Attachment: TS 63294, Copy 1. TS 68538/2, Copy 2 of 25

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Security information

MAR 19 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Frank Wisner

FROM:

Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens

SUBJECT:

Paper entitled "National Psychological Strategy", Draft No. 4, of 13 March, 1952.

l. The subject draft contains so much of value that it should be kept available in its present form for future consultation on matters beyond those dealing with the question at issue. It comes so close to providing the viewpoints that would meet the question at issue that only two more steps are needed to make it completely useable. These steps require only some decision and a little additional thinking. There is an excellent discussion of OPC's capabilities and limitations, but it leaves the user to draw conclusions with reference to them which should be drawn within OPC. It is therefore recommended that

- a. A final section be added clarifying what assets and capabilities OPC can most readily employ at present or in the very immediate future, i. e., those which are believed to be staffed, equipped, competent and effective.
- b. Include in this final section a formulation of specifically what can be accomplished with those assets.
- 2. I appreciate the difficulties that arise in doing this, some of which are apparent in the present draft. Some of the trouble arises from the great variety of things we would like to do and, in effect, the lack of a general orientation which, however, can only be attained when the whole problem of strategy is solved. If one keeps in mind that this paper is intended to be only a very limited and circumscribed approximation to one aspect of the general problem, some of the difficulties may be eased.
- 3. "Accomplishment" is necessarily tied up with effectiveness, or the extent to which our national interests are furthered and those of the USSR harmed. This particular paper is not required to solve the problem of what would be the most effective things we could do, except with reference to the employment of those assets which are singled out in a. above as most immediately useable. Nor does it have to solve the policy problem of whether or not a given accomplishment would be wholly desirable and acceptable. Even with these limitations in scope,


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the preparers of the paper will still have to use their native wit on what constitutes effectiveness and accomplishment. To assist in doing this, it is suggested that the new section differentiate between support of intangibles and accomplishment of a more clear-cut nature. Many of OPC's assets can only be effective in support of some US objective which is not too concrete, particularly in being able to define the extent to which it has been attained, such as the philosophy of Point IV. I would suggest separating out such "accomplishments" from those which can be visualized as gaining a clear, definite advantage.

- 1. This way of viewing the job should also result in some more integrated thought than is often done. Possibly some of the foreign organizations that are well controlled by OPC can be used for purposes other than those for which they were established. Some assets, such as propaganda ones, can support other assets which are suitable to direct action. And where OPC control over foreign organizations is not firm, but more in the nature of influence, -- such as a big trade union as distinct from a wholly-owned newspaper -- OPC capabilities can be expected to be greater when our objectives coincide with the objectives of such organizations.
- 5. If the paper ends up with a statement of any important, clear, definable advantages which can be attained through OPC's best and most useable immediate assets, it would be very gratifying. If the paper cannot end up that way and still covers its possibilities thoroughly and conscientiously, it will still have fulfilled the desired purpose of trying to think through this particular limited approach to the total problem of a "national strategy".
- 6. As regards the rest of the paper, I believe that Section V on "Recommended Policy Changes" should be revised to deal only with those which would further the accomplishments which will be visualized in the proposed final section. Otherwise it covers too much area that is not pertinent to this limited approach. It is also suggested that Annexes A, B, and C be omitted. This sort of thing is apt to be too encyclopaedic, often controversial, and does not appear to serve any useful purpose except possibly in helping organize the ideas of those who are responsible for preparing the paper.



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